Iraqi officials have been telling us for years that their great ambition was to bring an end to the United Nations mandate governing the presence of foreign troops. Only then, they reckoned, could Iraq consider itself truly free and sovereign.
Why is it, then, that the closer the US and Iraq inch towards a security accord that replaces the mandate and prepares for an American exit in 2011 the more hesitant the Iraqis become?
After months of negotiations, Washington and Baghdad recently declared that a final draft of the so-called Status of Forces Agreement had been reached. But the cabinet last week suddenly raised objections.
US officials, convinced they have put up with enough delay and conceded quite a bit along the way, are not hiding their exasperation. The US presidential elections are around the corner and the UN mandate expires at the end of December. “The clock is ticking,” said Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, warning that the accord’s failure would have “dramatic consequences”.
Yet the hesitations of Iraq should not come as a surprise. Incoherence and indecisiveness have been characteristic of the administration of Nouri al-Maliki. To be fair, the decision on SOFA is the most important the government, and the Shia bloc leading it, will take. That the search for consensus on it should be tortuous is to be expected. The wider problem, however, is that the Iraqi government is trapped between Iraq’s needs and Iraq’s dreams.
Shia parties are facing provincial elections later this year and a legislative poll next year. They recognise that the American presence is deeply unpopular, opposed most staunchly by the powerful movement of the young radical Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. A senior religious figure associated with the Sadr movement, and now in Iran, last week claimed SOFA was “a sin God won’t forgive”.
But the Shia bloc also has to face reality: despite significant improvement in security over the past year, Iraq is a mess, nowhere near ready to govern itself or protect its people. If the US were to withdraw precipitously, ethnic and religious struggles would be likely to explode into full-blown civil war.
The capabilities of the Iraqi army have improved but it is not ready to take over. As the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies says, security forces are “still very much work in progress”.
Nor has Iraq made sufficient progress towards national reconciliation between the majority Shia and the minority Kurds and Sunni Arabs. The Iraqi state remains dreadfully weak and the various communities still cannot agree on a legislative framework that fairly distributes oil resources.
It is ironic that many Sunni Arabs, who were most devastated by the 2003 US invasion, now look to America for protection from Iraqi Shia and their allies in Iran. Given the government crackdown on the Sunni “Awakening” councils – the US-backed former insurgents who turned against al-Qaeda – their worries appear justified.
Iraq’s Kurds also have yet to come to terms with the necessity of political compromise. Their determination to integrate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into their semi-autonomous northern region threatens to explode into a conflict that pits Arab against Kurd and sucks in the country’s neighbours.
But Americans, too, must face reality: a security agreement that Iraqi politicians cannot sell to their constituencies is a recipe for further instability.
Blaming Iraqi doubts on pressure from Iran is a predictable reaction. Yes, Iraqi leaders want Iran’s blessing for the accord because it makes their own lives easier. And yes, Tehran is not satisfied with the draft agreement. But trading accusations with Tehran over SOFA will not solve the problem.
It is also true that US negotiators have made numerous concessions on SOFA. They have agreed that US forces would first leave Iraqi cities by 2009 and then withdraw in 2011, even if the dates are goals that could be changed by mutual consent and depending on conditions on the ground. But a timetable for withdrawal is also beneficial for the US – it forces Iraqis to start taking responsibility for their own fate, and make compromises that might elude them if the US occupation persisted.
The US has conceded that, in criminal cases, foreign private security firms and contractors should be subject to Iraqi law – a big demand from Baghdad. But it has resisted Iraqi pressure for similar treatment for US military personnel.
What is the US to do if Iraqis do not relent? It would have little choice but to negotiate longer over Iraq’s remaining doubts. On closer inspection, the clock may not be ticking as fast as US officials would have us believe. Even if it is not an ideal outcome, the UN mandate governing foreign troops can be extended. Russia already has indicated that it would agree to an extension.
In any event, there is a case for this administration not to rush into a controversial security accord in its last days in office, but to leave it to be finalised by a new US president – particularly as the candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, disagree over Iraq.
No doubt the Bush team is keen to show that its exit from Iraq was more orderly than its stay. But the legacy of President George W. Bush should not be the priority here. Too many mistakes committed in Iraq have been driven by an American obsession with timetables that suited US interests but not necessarily those of Baghdad.
Why is it, then, that the closer the US and Iraq inch towards a security accord that replaces the mandate and prepares for an American exit in 2011 the more hesitant the Iraqis become?
After months of negotiations, Washington and Baghdad recently declared that a final draft of the so-called Status of Forces Agreement had been reached. But the cabinet last week suddenly raised objections.
US officials, convinced they have put up with enough delay and conceded quite a bit along the way, are not hiding their exasperation. The US presidential elections are around the corner and the UN mandate expires at the end of December. “The clock is ticking,” said Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, warning that the accord’s failure would have “dramatic consequences”.
Yet the hesitations of Iraq should not come as a surprise. Incoherence and indecisiveness have been characteristic of the administration of Nouri al-Maliki. To be fair, the decision on SOFA is the most important the government, and the Shia bloc leading it, will take. That the search for consensus on it should be tortuous is to be expected. The wider problem, however, is that the Iraqi government is trapped between Iraq’s needs and Iraq’s dreams.
Shia parties are facing provincial elections later this year and a legislative poll next year. They recognise that the American presence is deeply unpopular, opposed most staunchly by the powerful movement of the young radical Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. A senior religious figure associated with the Sadr movement, and now in Iran, last week claimed SOFA was “a sin God won’t forgive”.
But the Shia bloc also has to face reality: despite significant improvement in security over the past year, Iraq is a mess, nowhere near ready to govern itself or protect its people. If the US were to withdraw precipitously, ethnic and religious struggles would be likely to explode into full-blown civil war.
The capabilities of the Iraqi army have improved but it is not ready to take over. As the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies says, security forces are “still very much work in progress”.
Nor has Iraq made sufficient progress towards national reconciliation between the majority Shia and the minority Kurds and Sunni Arabs. The Iraqi state remains dreadfully weak and the various communities still cannot agree on a legislative framework that fairly distributes oil resources.
It is ironic that many Sunni Arabs, who were most devastated by the 2003 US invasion, now look to America for protection from Iraqi Shia and their allies in Iran. Given the government crackdown on the Sunni “Awakening” councils – the US-backed former insurgents who turned against al-Qaeda – their worries appear justified.
Iraq’s Kurds also have yet to come to terms with the necessity of political compromise. Their determination to integrate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into their semi-autonomous northern region threatens to explode into a conflict that pits Arab against Kurd and sucks in the country’s neighbours.
But Americans, too, must face reality: a security agreement that Iraqi politicians cannot sell to their constituencies is a recipe for further instability.
Blaming Iraqi doubts on pressure from Iran is a predictable reaction. Yes, Iraqi leaders want Iran’s blessing for the accord because it makes their own lives easier. And yes, Tehran is not satisfied with the draft agreement. But trading accusations with Tehran over SOFA will not solve the problem.
It is also true that US negotiators have made numerous concessions on SOFA. They have agreed that US forces would first leave Iraqi cities by 2009 and then withdraw in 2011, even if the dates are goals that could be changed by mutual consent and depending on conditions on the ground. But a timetable for withdrawal is also beneficial for the US – it forces Iraqis to start taking responsibility for their own fate, and make compromises that might elude them if the US occupation persisted.
The US has conceded that, in criminal cases, foreign private security firms and contractors should be subject to Iraqi law – a big demand from Baghdad. But it has resisted Iraqi pressure for similar treatment for US military personnel.
What is the US to do if Iraqis do not relent? It would have little choice but to negotiate longer over Iraq’s remaining doubts. On closer inspection, the clock may not be ticking as fast as US officials would have us believe. Even if it is not an ideal outcome, the UN mandate governing foreign troops can be extended. Russia already has indicated that it would agree to an extension.
In any event, there is a case for this administration not to rush into a controversial security accord in its last days in office, but to leave it to be finalised by a new US president – particularly as the candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, disagree over Iraq.
No doubt the Bush team is keen to show that its exit from Iraq was more orderly than its stay. But the legacy of President George W. Bush should not be the priority here. Too many mistakes committed in Iraq have been driven by an American obsession with timetables that suited US interests but not necessarily those of Baghdad.
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